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FEDERAL PROCEDURE-THE ERIE R. CO. V.
TOMPKINS RULE AND STATE CREATED
RIGHTS IN ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION
On June 19, 1948, plaintiffs' intestate died as a result of in-
juries received in a boat collision on the Ohio River in Campbell
County, Kentucky. Deceased was a passenger in a motor boat
owned and operated by the petitioner, which collided with a motor
boat owned and operated by the copetitioner. Decedent was a
resident of New York State, therefore, a domiciliary administrator
was appointed in New York on October 22, 1948, and an ancillary
administrator in Kenton County, Kentucky on December 7, 1948.
The District Court sustained a special demurrer as the appointment
of the ancillary administrator in Kenton County was void, granting
leave to amend. Amended libel was tendered on July 29, 1949, and
filed on September 9, 1949. The District Court sustained a general
demurrer as the period of limitations on death actions in Kentucky
had passed.1 Upon appeal, held, reversed. The general maritime
law was held controlling as opposed to the law of Kentucky which
created the right sued upon. Louis Leinson and Mitchell A. Hall
v. William Deupree, Jr. Ancillary Admin. of Wing,2 186 F.2d 297
(6th Cir. 1950).
The question herein involved is whether admiralty courts,
when invoked to enforce the rights created by state law and un-
known to admiralty,3 are bound by the law of such state, or the
general maritime law. Since 18864 the enforcement of state death
statutes in admiralty has been expressly justified5 under the "mari-
time but local" doctrine, i.e., the nature of the remedy is such that
it does not affect the uniformity requirement in admiralty.
The District Court held invalid the appointment of the ancil-
lary administrator in Kenton County since decedent was possessed
6f no estate there and further the injury to decedent occurred in
Campbell County. A glance at the time element of this case will
show how the statute of limitations would apply: (1) June 19,
1948-death of decedent, (2) December 7, 1948-invalid appoint-
1. K.ILS. 413.140 (1943) (-1. The following actions shall be commenced within one
year after the cause of action accrued: (a) an action for an injury to the person of the
plaintiff, or of his wife, child, ward, apprentice or servant.")
2. case was remanded for determination of the amount of judgment to be granted the
administrator. This trial was also appealed. 199 F.2d 760 (6th Cir. 1952). cert. denied
341 U.S. 915 (1952). upon appeal certiorari was granted, 73 Sup. Ct. 284 (1952).
3. Lindgren v. United States, 281 U.S. 38 (1930).
4.The Harrisburg 119 US 199 (1886).
5. Western Fuel 18o. v. Garcit. 257 U.S. 233 (1921).
ment ot the ancillary administrator, (3) July 28, 1949 valid ap-
pointment of administrator. This shows a lapse of one year and
forty days from the death to the appointment of an ancillary ad-
ministrator. In Quinette v. Bisso,6 after citing the wrongful death
statute of Louisiana, the court said: "Without this statute the
libelant could not maintain her libel. The statute must be applied
in admiralty just as if the suit had been brought in the state courts,
and any defenses which are open to the defendant under the juris-
prudence of the state, if successfully maintained, will bar recovery
under the libel." The above rule was again stated in 1921 by the
United States Supreme Court in Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia.7
There are two syllabi of the Garcia case:
"1. A death upon the navigable waters of a state whose
statutes give a right of action on account of death by
wrongful act will when caused by a maritime tort com-
mitted on such waters, support a libel in personam in the
admiralty courts for the damages sustained by those to
whom such right is given. 2. A state statute prescribing
one year as the period within which the statutory action
for death caused by wrongful act or negligence shall be
brought, governs a libel in personam, sustained by those to
whom such right of action is given from a death upon the
navigable waters of such state caused by a maritime tort
committed on such waters."
It will be seen from the foregoing and many other cases,8 that
every defense available in a Kentucky court to a suit brought for
wrongful death is available to petitioner in a court of admiralty.
Respondent finds 'the basis of its libel in a state-created right and
that being so the libelants should be made to take the statute in its
entirety and not just the particular portions which are advanta-
geous. Without this death by wrongful act statute respondent would
have no cause of action.
The Circuit Court of Appeals refused to extend the doctrine of
Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins,9 and Guaranty Trust Co. v. York 10 to
this case in admiralty overlooking the theory that uniformity in the
admiralty practice is required only when the essential features of
6. 136 F. 825 (5th Cit. 1905).
7. 257 U.S. 233 (1921).
8. See, Truelson v. Whitney. 10 F.2d 412 (5th Cir. 1926). cets. denied 271 U.S. 661(1926); Bloom v. Furnes Withy & Co., 293 F. 98 (S.D. Cal. 1923); O'Brien v.
Luckenback S.S. Co., 293 F. 170 (2d Cit. 1923); Robinson v. Detroit & C. Steam
Navigation Co.. 73 F. 883 (6th Cir. 1896).
304 U.S. 64 (1938).
10. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
an exclusive federal jurisdiction are involved, as held by the United
States Supreme Court in Just v. Chambers" and Standard Dredg-
ing Corporation v. Murphy12 where the "maritime but local"
doctrine was applied.
Respondent argued that to grant or deny leave to amend is a
matter of procedural and not substantive law, it is controlled by
the law of the forum, and that under the holding of the United
States Supreme Court in Missouri, Kansas and Texas Ry. Co. v.
Wulf 13 the amendment is proper and relates back to the date of
the filing of the original pleading so as to save the cause from the
bar of the statute of limitation. With this contention the Court of
Appeals agreed. Upon some thought it will be noted that if that
decision is not reversed it will establish not only a double system
of conflicting laws in the same state, but a double system in the
same court in actions founded on the same state statute. If in this
case in question the jurisdiction of the federal court had been in,
voked because of diversity of citizenship, the original judgment of
the District Court would of necessity have been affirmed under
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York. Should the mere circumstance of the
fatal accident to decedent having occurred upon a water highway
of Kentucky instead of a turnpike, road or street, vest respondent
in a federal admiralty court with a right denied him in a federal
court? To answer affirmatively would do violence to Guaranty
Trust Co. v. York, which has been thought to express a federal
policy. 14
In Guaranty TrustCo. v. York, 15 the court said: "Here we are
dealing with a right to recover derived not from the United States
but from one of the States, when because the plaintiff happens to
be a non-resident, such a right is enforceable in a federal as well
as in a State court, the forms and mode of enforcing the right may
at times, naturally enough, vary because the two judicial systems
are not identic. But since a federal court adjudicating a State-
created right solely because of the diversity of citizenship of the
parties is for that purpose, in effect, only another court of the State,
it cannot afford recovery if the right to recover is made unavailable
by the State nor can it substantially affect the enforcement of the
right as given by the State."
n. 312 U.s. 383 (1941).
12. 319 U.S. 306 (1943).
13. 226 U.S. 570 (1913).
14. Rose v. United States, 73 F. Supp. 759.763 (E.D. N.Y. 1947).
15. 326 U.S. 99. 108 (1945).
The question is not whether the statute of limitations is a
matter of "procedure" but whether that statute deals with the
manner and means whereby the right to recover,as recognized by
the state, is enforced, "or whether such statutory limitation is a
matter of substance in the aspect that alone is relevant to the pro-
blem, namely, does it significantly affect the result of a litigation for
a federal court to disregard a law of a State that would be con-
trolling in an action upon the same claim by the same parties in a
State court?"16 The true test here would seem to be whether a
different result would be obtained if the same cause between the
same parties be litigated in a state as compared to a federal court.
If so, the state rule must prevail.
It is not sufficient for respondent to say that the granting or
denying leave to amend is a mere matter of procedure, as distin-
guished from substantive law, and is therfore, governed by the
decisions of the federal courts even though such decisions be in
conflict with those of the Court of Appeals of Kentucky. The ob-
jection to the amendment of the appointment of the ancillary ad-
ministrator goes deeper. It strikes at the very right to maintain an
action.
The rule of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins and Guaranty Trust Co.
v. York compels that no substantially different result be obtained
whether the substantial view or the procedural view be correct,
when the state law says, "no recovery to respondent."
Charles B. Lester
16. Id. at 109.
